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Real-Time Mission Management in Next Generation Spacecraft: Human Factors Challenges

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- Shuttle Most complex flight vehicle ever designed
 - Experimental: First Generation Design
- Large number of *very complex* engineering systems:
 - Propulsion
 - Electrical
 - Life Support
 - Navigation
 - Communication
- Operating Conditions:
 - Extremely Harsh & Dynamic
- Result:
 - Systems malfunctions are a *real and present danger* to crew safety and mission success






- Each shuttle system extensively instrumented:
- Scores of sensors measuring various operational parameters:
 - pressures
 - temperatures
 - flow rates
 - RPMs
- Must be monitored continuously to:
 - Maintain awareness of
 - Systems mode
 - System functioning





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- Problem:
- Insufficient display real estate in the cockpit
- Not enough pairs of eyes to process it (2 crew + 1 mission specialist)



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- Approximately 100 subject matter experts at Mission Control
- dedicated group for each system
- monitor telemetered information from vehicle
- work real-time mission management in tight collaboration with the crew



Propulsion




ECLSS



GN&C




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


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Control room hierarchy





Tightly coupled Crew-Ground Coordination



- Tightly-coupled crew-ground coordination not possible
- More autonomous concept of operations required




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- Onboard mission management capabilities have to be enhanced




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- Fundamental CEV Design Problem:
- How to enhance onboard mission management capabilities given the:
 - Limited display real estate in the cockpit
 - Limited pairs of eyes onboard the vehicle



- A solution in two parts:
Part 1: Enhanced onboard automation






- Part 2: Maximize Crew Mission Management Capabilities
 - Optimize Human-Automation Interactions
 - Define appropriate Human-machine Functional Allocation
 - Prevent well known human factors pitfalls
 - e.g., The “OOTLUF” Problem
 - Design and evaluate user interfaces to support selected functional allocation
 - Avoiding “Clumsy Automation”
 - Make greater use of human information processing capabilities
 - Multi-modal interfaces



- A human-centered empirical approach:
- Define appropriate Human-Machine functional allocation
 - Start with a thorough empirical characterization of mission management activities in today's cockpit
 - In “no-comm” (autonomous) mode



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Intelligent Spacecraft Interface Systems (ISIS) Lab Overview

Equipment

- 12 liquid crystal displays (LCDs) with touch screens representing
 - cockpit displays
 - side panels
 - overhead panels
 - keyboard
- A multi-platform computer network
- ISCAN ETL-500 eye tracking system
- Audio system
- An experimenter controller station




MET ~ 8.30

***MM 103:
2nd Stage***

**MAIN ENGINE
CUTOFF, EXTERNAL
TANKS SEPARATION**

Altitude:
59 nautical miles
Velocity: 25,581 feet
per second about 8.5
minutes after launch
(just before orbit
insertion)



SRB SEPARATION
Two minutes after
launch



MET 2:00

***MM 102:
1st stage***

LAUNCH
Maximum dynamic
pressure about
60 seconds
after launch




MM 101

Prelaunch



• Ascent Checklist Items:



• Continuous Tasks:

• Check Navigation State:

- Trajectory, Velocity, Vertical Velocity, Attitude
- Current Abort Options


• Check Systems Health:

- Main Engines:
 - Ullage Pressures
 - Helium flows



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GNC Regions
 Systems
 Neither



LCD1

LCD2

LCD3-Traj1

LCD4

11

12

No specific plane

Flight Data File


Keyboard

C3-R4


R1

R2

Invalid Switch Throws:




Fault Management Stages





*“If 2(3) $P_s < 31.6$ or > 34.5
MPS ULL PRESS - OP
When all $P_s > 34.5$
MPS LH2 ULL PRESS - Auto”*



BFS GNC SYS SUM 1

```

1021/ /018 GNC SYS SUMM 1 5 000/00:01:54
BFS 000/00:00:00

SURP POS MOM OPS 1 2 3 4
L OB MDM FF
IB FA
R IB PL
AIL
RUD FCS CH 1 2 3 4
SPD BRK
BDV FLP

MPS L C R NAV 1 2 3 4
HE TK P 3640 3680 3670 IMU
REG P A 748 756 750 TAC
B 744 760 756 ADTA
dP/dT 20 10 10

MPS PNEU HE P
ULL P LH2 33.6 33.5 33.6 TK 4280
LO2 21.1 21.0 21.1 REG 754
ACUM 759
GH2 OUT P 3460 3480 2980 MANF P LH2 31
GO2 OUT T 390 380 400 LO2 75
  
```

MPS LH2/O2 ULL




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“If $2(3) P_s < 31.6$ or > 34.5

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
Experiment



- Characterize and quantify nominal and off-nominal behavior in a task environment representative of current spacecraft cockpits.
- Demonstrate the validity of using eye movement measurements to infer multi-tasking strategies and characterize multi-tasking behavior.
- Compare behavior of “novices” (retired United Airline Pilots) with experts (Current Astronauts).




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- 4 ascent runs per participant, each 8.5 minute in duration
- 3 types of trials: nominal runs, multiple-malfunction run, single-malfunction run






United Airline Pilots: Fixation Distribution





Astronauts: Fixation Distribution







Sequences of Fixations on GNC Displays by Astronauts






Fixation Sequences on Systems Displays by Astronauts





Information Acquisition Strategies: Nominal Runs

- Sequences longer than those predicted by stratified random





Performance Results for Single-Malfunction Runs


Low H₂ Ullage
Pressure



	Pilots	Astronauts
Procedures performed correctly:	4/5 (80%)	5/5 (100%)
Response time:	0:57	0:22

- Accuracy higher and response time faster better for the astronauts

• Multi-Mal Run Results



Helium Regulator Failure

	Pilots	Astronauts
Procedures performed correctly:	0/6 (0%)	5/5 (100%)
Response time:	"2:48"	2:48

Computer Failure

	Pilots	Astronauts
Procedures performed correctly:	1/3 (33%)	4/5 (80%)
Response time:	2:49	1:31

Coolant Failure

	Pilots	Astronauts
Procedures performed correctly:	2/6 (33%)	4/4 (100%)
Response time:	3:43	1:52



Performance Results for Single-Malfunction Runs

Low H₂ Ullage
Pressure





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


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


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




A Tale of Two Strategies

- Time Share: Divide attention between Fault Management and nominal scan



- No Time Share: Devote full attention to Fault Management activities








- Conclusions:
 - Nominal runs:
 - More attention to flight displays than systems displays
 - Participants shift back and forth between acting as
 - Pilots of a flight vehicle
 - Process controllers
 - Off-nominal runs:
 - Fault management causes:
 - Cognitive tunneling on fault-related information
 - Up to several minutes in duration
 - Primary fault management “time sinks”:
 - Reading flight data files
 - Locating cockpit switches



- Determine appropriate level of human-machine functional allocation (level of autonomy)






OPS Concept: HCI for Level IV automation

- Dedicated Malfunction Handling display:

- Magnifies system area where fault exists
- Procedures prioritized
 - Electronic flight data file
 - Green color coding
- Virtual switch icon
 - Green switch position indicator

Graphical reconfiguration cue


- green valve circle indicator
- Permission: Physically touch green switch position indicator





Step 1:


- Left helium isol valve A now closed
- Flow through Leg A: gray (no flow)
- Text message turns gray
- Virtual switch:
 - Position indicator white
 - shows actual position (CL)
- Automation:
 - assesses system status
 - dP/dt still off-nominal high






Step 2: Open Left ISOL Valve A

- Display indications:
- First procedural de-emphasized
 - (gray; moved down)
- New procedure in green
- Valve indicator green:
 - commanded state change
- Commanded switch position
 - Indicated, also in green
- Crewmember:
 - touches commanded switch position indicator






- System Status:
 - ISOL Valve A, B Open
 - dP/dt still indicating problem






Step 3: Close Left ISOL Valve B

- Display indications:
- 2nd procedural de-emphasized
 - (gray; moved down)
- New procedure in yellow
- B Valve indicator yellow:
 - commanded state change
- Commanded switch position
 - Indicated, also in yellow
- Permission:
 - Crewmember touches commanded switch position indicator






- Procedures complete:
- Display indications:
- dP/dt back to nominal color and value
- Final system/switch configuration shown






- Goal: Maximizing crew mission management capabilities
- Clear Limitation with Level IV concept:
- Virtually All human-system interactions are still visual-manual





- Grossly underutilizes available human information processing resources
- Multi-modal human-automation interface channels





Future Directions

- **Near Term:**
 - Baseline measure of Level IV Automation Concept
 - First: visual-manual concept only
 - Then: visual-manual augmented with auditory-vocal channel
- **Far Term:**
 - Develop capability for multi-modal human-machine interaction in two crewmember cockpit